We determine the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Furthermore, we determine the secrecy capacity of a mixed channel model which is compound from the sender to the legal receiver and varies arbitrarily from the sender to the eavesdropper. As an application we examine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and show that resources, i.e., having access to a perfect copy of the outcome of a random experiment. are helpful for channel stability.
Introduction
In the last few years the developments in modern communication systems produced many results in a short amount of time. Especially quantum communication systems developed into a very active field, setting new properties and limits. Our goal is to deliver a general theory considering both channel robustness against jamming and security against eavesdropping in quantum information theory, since many modern communication systems are often not perfect, but are vulnerable to jamming and eavesdropping. The transmitters have to solve two main problems. First, the message (a secret key or a secure message) has to be encoded robustly, i.e., despite channel uncertainty it can be decoded correctly by the legal receiver. Second, the message has to be encoded in such a way that the wiretapper's knowledge of the transmitted classical message can be kept arbitrarily small. This work is a progress to our previous paper [20] .
In our previous work [20] we investigate the transmission of messages from a sending to a receiving party. The messages ought to be kept secret from an eavesdropper. Communication takes place over a quantum channel which is, in addition to noise from the environment, subjected to the action of a jammer which actively manipulates the states. The Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels was established i.e., either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero, or it equals its shared randomness assisted capacity. We also analyze the secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels when the sender and the receiver use various resources and show that resources are helpful for robust and secure information transmission. We found out that even using the weakest non-secure resource (the correlation) one can achieve the same security capacity using a strong resource as the common randomness. But non the less a capacity formula has not been given in [20] .
In this paper we carry on our investigation of arbitrarily varying classicalquantum wiretap channels and shared randomness. We deliver a capacity formula for secure information transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel using correlation as resource. Together with the result of [20] it yields the formula for deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. Using this formula we analyze the stability of secrecy capacity, i.e., we ask under which condition it is discontinuous as a function of channel parameters, in other words, when small variations in the underlying model change dramatically the effect of the jammer's actions.
To determine our capacity formula we follow the idea of [12] and [37] in the classical cases: At first we consider a mixed channel model that is called the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. Then we apply Ahlswede's robustification technique to establish the common randomness assisted secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. As a direct consequence of our capacity formula we show a sharing resource is very helpful for the channel stability in the sense that it provide continuity of secrecy capacities.
Quantum mechanics differs significantly from classical mechanics, it has its own laws. A quantum channel is a communication channel which can transmit quantum information. In this paper, we consider the classical-quantum channels, i.e., the sender's inputs are classical data and the receiver's outputs are quantum systems. The capacity of classical-quantum channels has been determined in [30] and [36] .
In the model of an arbitrarily varying channel, we consider channel uncertainty, i.e., transmission over a channel which is not stationary, but can change with every use of the channel. We interpret it as a channel with a jammer who may change his input in every channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. It is understood that the sender and the receiver have to select their coding scheme first. After that the jammer makes his choice of the channel state to sabotage the message transmission. However, due to the physical properties, we consider that the jammer's changes only take place in a known set. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in [16] . The jammer may have on the communication link under use: In the most restrictive case where the jammer is left with only one choice we recover the discrete memoryless channel.
On the other extreme it has been shown by Ahlswede in [1] that the capacity (under maximal error criterion) of certain arbitrarily varying channels can be equated to the zero-error capacity of related discrete memoryless channels. The arbitrarily varying channel does at the same time demonstrate the importance of shared randomness for communication in a very clear form: [2] (cf. also [3] and [4] ) showed a surprising result which is now known as the Ahlswede Dichotomy (either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero, or it equals its shared randomness assisted capacity). After that discovery it remained an open question exactly when the deterministic capacity is nonzero. In [27] a sufficient condition for that has been given, and in [24] proves that this condition is also necessary.
A classical-quantum channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel. The arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel was introduced in [6] . A lower bound for its capacity has been given. An alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse is given in [12] . In [5] , the Ahlswede Dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic capacity is given. In [21] , a simplification of this condition for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is given.
In the model of a wiretap channel, we consider communication with security. This was first introduced in [40] (in this paper we will use a stronger security criterion than [40] 's security criterion, cf. Remark 2.9). We interpret the wiretap channel as a channel with an eavesdropper.
A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classicalquantum wiretap channel, its secrecy capacity has been determined in [25] and [23] .
In the model of an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, we consider transmission with both a jammer and an eavesdropper. Its secrecy capacity has been analyzed in [15] . A lower bound of the randomness assisted secrecy capacity has been given. An important assumption for this work is that the eavesdropper cannot send any message to the jammer. The reverse direction, e.g. communication from the jammer to the eavesdropper, is explicitly allowed.
A classical-quantum channel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper is called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. It is defined as a family of pairs of indexed channels {(W t , V t ) : t = 1, · · · , T } with a common input alphabet and possible different output alphabets, connecting a sender with two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper, where t is called a channel state of the channel pair. The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first part of the pair, i.e., the first channel W t in the pair, and the wiretapper observes the output of the second part, i.e., the second channel V t , respectively. A channel state t, which varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, governs both the legal receiver's channel and the wiretap channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the transmitted information in the sense of the stronger security criterion (cf. Remark 2.9). This is a generalization of compound classical-quantum wiretap channels in [19] , when the channel states are not stationary, but can change over time.
The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels has been analyzed in [17] . A lower bound of the randomness assisted capacity has been given, and it has been shown that:this bound is either a lower bound for the deterministic capacity, or else the deterministic capacity is equal to zero.
Assume that a bipartite source, modeled by an i.i.d. random variable (X, Y ) with values in a finite product set X × Y, is observed by the sender and (legal) receiver. The sender has access to the random variable X, and the receiver to Y . We call (X, Y ) correlated shared randomness whenever the mutual information between X and Y satisfies I(X; Y ) > 0. It has been shown in [7] that correlated shared randomness is a helpful resource for information transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical channel: The use of mere correlation does already allow one to transmit messages at any rate that would be achievable using any form of shared randomness. The capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel assisted by correlated shared randomness as resource has been discussed in [21] , where equivalent results were found. The work [21] also put emphasis on the quantification of the differences between correlated shared randomness and common randomness and used the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel as a method of proof. In this work, we extend the concept of correlation-assisted coding to the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
We concentrate our analysis on the case without feedback, i.e., we neither allow the receiver to send messages back to the sender (or the jammer), nor do we allow the eavesdropper to send messages towards the jammer (or the sender). Such an approach may be deemed unsatisfactory from a practical perspective. However, a brief look into the history of the arbitrarily varying channel reveals that only the reduction to the case of deterministic codes (without feedback) leads one to encounter those cases where the capacity of the system is zero, while a dramatic increase to full capacity is possible as soon as shared randomness (or feedback) is available.
The continuity of the message-and entanglement transmission capacity of a stationary memoryless quantum channel has been listed as an open problem in [41] and was solved in [31] . In [22] it has been shown when the message transmission capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channels is continuous.
The condition for continuity of message transmission capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel has been given in [37] . This paper is organized as follows.
The main definitions are given in Section 2. In Section 3 we determine a capacity formula for a mixed channel model, i.e. the enhanced secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. This formula will be used for our result in Section 4.
In Section 4 our main result is presented. We determine in this section the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
As an application of our main result, in Section 5 we discuss when the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is a continuous quantity of the system parameters.
Preliminaries

Basic Notations
For a finite set A, we denote the set of probability distributions on A by P(A). Let ρ 1 and ρ 2 be Hermitian operators on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space G. We say ρ 1 ≥ ρ 2 and ρ 2 ≤ ρ 1 if ρ 1 − ρ 2 is positive-semidefinite. For a finitedimensional complex Hilbert space G, we denote the set of density operators on G by
where L(G) is the set of linear operators on G, and 0 G is the null matrix on G.
Note that any operator in S(G) is bounded.
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces G and G a quantum channel N : S(G) → S(G ), S(G) ρ → N (ρ) ∈ S(G ) is represented by a completely positive trace preserving map which accepts input quantum states in S(G) and produces output quantum states in S(G ).
If the sender wants to transmit a classical message of a finite set A to the receiver using a quantum channel N , his encoding procedure will include a classical-to-quantum encoder to prepare a quantum message state ρ ∈ S(G) suitable as an input for the channel. If the sender's encoding is restricted to transmit an indexed finite set of quantum states {ρ x : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G), then we can consider the choice of the signal quantum states ρ x as a component of the channel. Thus, we obtain a channel σ x := N (ρ x ) with classical inputs x ∈ A and quantum outputs, which we call a classical-quantum channel. This is a map N:
meaning that each classical input of x ∈ A leads to a distinct quantum output σ x ∈ S(G ). In view of this, we have the following definition. Remark 2.1. In many literature a classical-quantum channel is defined as a map A → S(H), A a → W (a) ∈ S(H). This is a special case when the input is limited on the set {P a : a ∈ A}.
For a probability distribution P on a finite set A and a positive constant δ, we denote the set of typical sequences by T n P,δ := a n ∈ A n : N (a | a n ) − P (a ) ≤
where N (a | a n ) is the number of occurrences of the symbol a in the sequence a n .
Let n ∈ N, we define A n := {(a 1 , · · · , a n ) : a i ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}}. The space which the vectors {v 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ v n : v i ∈ H ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}} span is denoted by H ⊗n . We also write a n for the elements of A n .
Associated to W is the channel map on the n-block W ⊗n : P (A n ) → S(H ⊗n ), such that W ⊗n (P n ) = W (P 1 ) ⊗ · · · ⊗ W (P n ) if P n ∈ P(A n ) can be given by P n (a n ) = j P j (a j ) for every a n = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) ∈ A n . Let θ := {1, · · · , T } be a finite set. Let W t : t ∈ θ be a set of classical-quantum channels. For t n = (t 1 , · · · , t n ), t i ∈ θ we define the n-block W t n such that for W t n (P n ) = W t1 (P 1 ) ⊗ · · · ⊗ W tn (P n ) if P n ∈ P(A n ) can be given by P n (a n ) = j P j (a j ) for every a n = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) ∈ A n .
For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(G) we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ by S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by G P and G Q , respectively. Let φ PQ be a bipartite quantum state in S(G PQ ). We denote the conditional entropy by
Here φ Q = tr P (φ PQ ). The quantum mutual information is denoted by
Let Φ := {ρ a : a ∈ A} be a set of quantum states labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution P on A the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
For a set A and a Hilbert space G let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For a probability distribution P on A the Holevo χ quantity of the channel for V with input distribution P is defined as
Let G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let n ∈ N and α > 0. We suppose ρ ∈ S(G) has the spectral decomposition ρ = x P (x)|x x|, its αtypical subspace is the subspace spanned by |x n , x n ∈ T n P,α . The orthogonal subspace projector onto the typical subspace is
Similarly let A be a finite set, and G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. For a ∈ A suppose V(a) has the spectral decomposition V(a) = j V (j|a)|j j| for a stochastic matrix V (·|·). The α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence a n is the subspace spanned by a∈A |j Ia , j Ia ∈ T Ia V (·|a),δ . Here I a := {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : a i = a} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence a n = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) for which the i-th symbol a i is equal to a ∈ A. The subspace is often referred as the α-conditional typical subspace of the state V ⊗n (a n ). The orthogonal subspace projector onto it is defined as
The typical subspace has following properties:
For σ ∈ S(G ⊗n ) and α > 0 there are positive constants β(α), γ(α), and δ(α), depending on α such that
2 n(S(σ)−δ(α)) ≤ tr (Π σ,α ) ≤ 2 n(S(σ)+δ(α)) ,
For a n ∈ T n P,α there are positive constants β(α) , γ(α) , and δ(α) , depending on α such that
2 −n(S(V|P )+γ(α) ) Π V,α (a n ) ≤ Π V,α (a n )V ⊗n (a n )Π V,α (a n )
2 n(S(V|P )−δ(α) ) ≤ tr (Π V,α (a n )) ≤ 2 n(S(V|P )+δ(α) ) .
For the classical-quantum channel V : P(A) → S(G) and a probability distribution P on A we define a quantum state P V := V(P ) on S(G). For α > 0 we define an orthogonal subspace projector Π P V,α fulfilling (1), (2), and (3) . Let x n ∈ T n P,α For Π P V,α there is a positive constant β(α) , following inequality holds:
We give here a sketch of proof. For a detailed proof please see [38] .
Proof. (1) holds because tr (σΠ σ,α ) = tr (Π σ,α σΠ σ,α ) = P (T n P,α ).
) for x ∈ T n P,α and a positive γ(α). (4), (5) , and (6) can be obtain in similar way. (7) follows from the permutation-invariance of Π P V,α .
Communication Scenarios and Code Concepts
Definition 2.2. Let A be a finite set, let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space, and θ := {1, · · · , T } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ let W t be a quantum channel P(A) → S(H). We call the set of the quantum channels {W t : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channelwhen the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner.
When the sender inputs a sequence a n ∈ A n into the channel, the receiver receives the output W n t (a n ) ∈ S(H ⊗n ), where t n = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n ) ∈ θ n is the channel state of W n t . Definition 2.3. We say that the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
When the sender inputs a sequence a n ∈ A n into the channel, the receiver receives the output W ⊗n t (a n ) ∈ S(H ⊗n ), where t n = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n ) ∈ θ n is the channel state, while the wiretapper receives an output quantum state V ⊗n t (a n ) ∈ S(H ⊗n ).
Definition 2.4. Let A be a finite set. Let H and H be finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ let W t be a quantum channel P(A) → S(H) and V t be a quantum channel P(A) → S(H ). We call the set of the quantum channel pairs {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel, when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, while the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., W t in the pair (W t , V t ), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel, i.e., V t in the pair (W t , V t ), respectively.
Definition 2.5. Let A be a finite set. Let H and H be finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } and θ := {1, 2, · · · } be index sets. For every s ∈ θ let W s be a quantum channel P(A) → S(H). For every t ∈ θ let V t be a quantum channel P(A) → S(H ). We call the set of the quantum channel pairs {(W s , V t ) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} a compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel, when the channel state s remains constant over time, but the legitimate users can not control which s in the set θ will be used, and the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, while the legal receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., W s in the pair (W s , V t ), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel, i.e., V t in the pair (W s , V t ), respectively. Definition 2.6. An (n, J n ) (deterministic) code C for a classical-quantum channel consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , J n } → P(A n ), specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive semidefinite operators {D j : j ∈ {1, · · · , J n }} ⊂ S(H ⊗n ), which is a partition of the identity, i.e. Jn j=1 D j = id H ⊗n . We call these operators the decoder operators.
A code is created by the sender and the legal receiver before the message transmission starts. The sender uses the encoder to encode the message that he wants to send, while the legal receiver uses the decoder operators on the channel output to decode the message.
Definition 2.7. An (n, J n ) randomness assisted quantum code for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel
where we denote the set of (n, J n ) deterministic codes by Λ and σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → P e (C γ , t n )
where R uni is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · J n }. Here P e (C, t n ) (the average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the channel state of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} is t n = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n )), is defined as
, · · · , J n } is the set of the resulting quantum state at the output of the wiretap channel when the channel state of
Remark 2.9. A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we replace (9) with max t∈θ 1 n χ (R uni ; Z t n ) < ζ. In this paper we will follow [14] and use (9) . Definition 2.10. An (n, J n ) common randomness assisted quantum code for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) :
t ∈ θ} is a finite subset C γ = {(E γ , D γ j ) : j = 1, · · · , J n } : γ ∈ Γ of the set of (n, J n ) deterministic codes, labeled by a finite set Γ. Definition 2.11. A non-negative number R is an achievable enhanced secrecy rate for the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel {(W s , V t ) : s ∈ θ, t ∈ θ} if for every > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists an (n, J n ) code C = E n , {D n j : j = 1, · · · J n } such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
where R uni is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · J n }.
Here P e (C, s, n) is defined as follows
and Z t n ,π = a n ∈A n E n (π(a n )|1)V t n (π(a n )), a n ∈A n E n (π(a n )|2)V t n (π(a n )), · · · , a n ∈A n E n (π(a n )|J n )V t n (π(a n )) .
Definition 2.13. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} under common randomness assisted quantum coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and > 0, if n is sufficiently large, there is an (n, J n ) common randomness assisted quantum code ({C γ : γ ∈ Γ}) such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
This means that we do not require the common randomness to be secure against eavesdropping.
Definition 2.14. Let X and Y be finite sets. We denote the sets of joint probability distributions on X and Y by P (X, Y). Let (X, Y ) be a random variable distributed to a joint probability distribution p ∈ P (X, Y). An (X, Y )correlation assisted (n, J n ) code C(X, Y ) for the arbitrarily varying classicalquantum wiretap channel (W t , V t ) t∈θ consists of a set of stochastic encoders {E x n : {1, · · · , J n } → P(A n ) : x n ∈ X n }, and a set of collections of positive semidefinite operators {D
where P e (C(x n , y n ), t n ) := 1− 1
Jn
Jn j=1 a n ∈A n E x n (a n |j)tr(W t n (a n )D
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates under common randomness assisted quantum coding of
The supremum of all achievable enhanced secrecy rates of
Compound-Arbitrarily
Varying Wiretap Classical-Quantum Channel Let A, H, H , θ, and (W t , V t ) t∈θ be defined as in Section
Following the idea of [37] , we first prove the following Theorem.
where B s are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legal receiver's channels. Z t n are the resulting quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → A → B ⊗n s Z t n for every s ∈ θ and t n ∈ θ n . A is here a random variable taking values on A, U a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution p U .
Proof. We fix a probability distribution p ∈ P(A). Let
..,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln} be a family of random variables taking value according to p , i.e., with the uniform distribution over T n P,δ . Here L n is a natural number which will be specified later.
We fix a t n ∈ θ n and define a map V :
Lemma 3.2 (Gentle Operator, cf. [39] and [34] ). Let ρ be a quantum state and X be a positive operator with X ≤ I and
The Gentle Operator was first introduced in [39] , where it has been shown
In [34] , the result of [39] has been improved, and (13) has been proved.
In view of the fact that Π V(·,p),α (t n ) and Π V,α (t n , x n ) are both projection matrices, by (1), (7) , and Lemma 3.2 for any t and x n , it holds that
The following Lemma was first given in [8] . Here we cite the Lemma as it was formulated in [38] , 
We denote ρ := m p(m)ρ m . We define a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
For our result we use an alternative Covering Lemma 
We denote ω := mM p(m)ρ m . Notice that ω is not a density operator in general. We define a sequence of i.i.d. random variables X 1 , . . . , X L , taking values in {ρ m : m ∈ M}. If L d D then
Proof. We define a function 1 M :
where 0 V is the zero operator on V, i.e., j|0 V |j = 0 for all j ∈ V. Notice that 0 V is not a density operator. 
LetΠ be the projector onto the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of m∈M p(m)ΠΠ m ρ m Π m Π whose corresponding eigenvalues are greater than p(M ) D .
Following three inequalities can be shown by the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [38] :
The last inequality holds because
(i.e., we assume the event considered in (22) below), then
i) Application of the Operator Chernoff Bound
as a consequence of the inequality A † BA ≤ A † A which is valid whenever B ≤ id. By (21) and the fact that d · 0 V ≤Π we have for all m ∈ M
Now we apply the Operator Chernoff Bound (cf. [38] ) on the set of operator {d1 M (ρ m ) : m ∈ M}} and the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of m∈M p(m)ΠΠ m ρ m ΠΠ m whose corresponding eigenvalues are greater than p(M ) D , hereΠ acts as the identity on the subspace.
By (18) we obtain
ii) 
We apply the gentle operator lemma (cf. [38] ) to obtain
When {ρ 1 , · · · , ρ L } fulfills
≤ (i.e., we assume the event considered in (22) occur and thus (20) holds), then by (19) and (23) it holds
iii) Upper Bound for
When the event considered in (22) is true, i.e. when (24) holds, then by (17) tr
the last inequality holds because
In view of the fact that Π and Π i are projection matrices for every
i.e. we assume that the event considered in (22) is true, then by (17) and the triangle inequality we have
Since
we have
which implies
By (29) we have
By (2) we have tr(Π V(·,p),α (t n )) ≤ 2 n(S(V(·,p)|q)+δ(α)) = 2 n( t q(t)V(t,p)+δ(α)) = 2 n( t q(t)S(Vt(p))+δ(α)) .
Furthermore, for all x n holds
We define θ := t ∈ θ : nq(t) ≥ √ n .
By properties of classical typical set (cf. [39] ) there is a positiveβ(α) such that
where I t := {i ∈ {1, · · · , n} : t i = t} is an indicator set that selects the indices i in the sequence t n = (t 1 , · · · , t n ).
We denote the set {x n :
where C := max t∈θ max x∈A (S(V(t, x)) + S(V t |p)). We set Θ t n := x n ∈M t n p(x n )Q t n (x n ). For given z n ∈ M t n and t n ∈ θ n , z n |Θ t n |z n is the expected value of z n |Q t n (x n )|z n under the condition x n ∈ M t n .
We choose a positiveβ(α) such thatβ(α) ≤ min(2 −nβ(α) , 2 −nβ(α) ), and set := 2 −nβ(α) . In view of (32) we now apply Lemma 3.4, where we consider the set M t n ⊂ A n : If n is sufficiently large for all j we have
The equality holds since S(V t (p)) − S(V t |p) = χ(p; Z t ). Furthermore
P r
Let φ j t be the quantum state at the output of wiretapper's channel when the channel state is t and j has been sent. We have
Let H T be a |θ| dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal basis {|t : t = 1, · · · , |θ|}. Let H J be a J n dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal basis {|j : j = 1, · · · , J n }. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [20] we define
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy it holds S(ϕ
For an arbitrary ζ we define L n = 2 max t n χ(p;Z t n )+nζ , and choose a suitable α,β(α), and sufficiently large n such that 6β(α) + 2δ(α) +2δ(α) +2|θ| δ n C +2|θ| 1 √ n C ≤ ζ. By (37) if n is sufficiently large we have L n ≥ 2 n( t q(t)χ(p;Zt)+ζ) and
When n is sufficiently large for any positive ϑ J n |θ| n 2 n( t,x r(t,x)S(V(t,x))+δ(α) exp(−2
Thus for sufficiently large n we have
for any positive .
Now we have J n · L n < 2 n(mins χ(p;Bs)−µ) . In [11] and [13] following was shown (using results of [29] ). Let {Ẋ j,l } j∈{1,...,Jn},l∈{1,...,Ln} be a family of random variables taking value according toṗ ∈ P(A n ). If n is sufficiently large, and if J n ·L n ≤ 2 mins n(χ(ṗ;Bs)−µ) for an arbitrary positive µ there exists a projection q x n on H for every x n ∈ A n and positive constants β and γ such that for any (s, j, l) ∈ θ × {1, . . . , J n } × {1, . . . , L n } it holds
where for j ∈ {1, . . . , J n }, l ∈ {1, . . . , L n } we have
Notice that be definition for any realization {ẋ j,l : j, l} of {Ẋ j,l : j, l} it holds that
Jn j=1
Ln l=1 Dẋ j,l ≤ I. (actually in [18] it was shown that there exists a collection of positivesemidefinite operators {D s,Ẋ j,l : s ∈ θ, j ∈ {1, . . . , J n }, l ∈ {1, . . . , L n }} such that for any s, j, and l it holds = 1 − 1 P (T n p,δ ) a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )W ⊗n s (a n ) + a n / ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )W ⊗n s (a n ) .
Lemma 3.5 (Fannes-Audenaert Ineq., cf. [28] , [10] ). Let Φ and Ψ be two quantum states in a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space and
where h(ν) :
The Fannes Inequality was first introduced in [28] , where it has been shown that |S(Φ)−S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log d−µ log µ. In [10] the result of [28] has been improved, and (40) has been proved. By Lemma 3.5 for any positive ω if n is sufficiently large we have
≤ ω .
Furthermore we have a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n ) − a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n )
a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n ) + a n / ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n )
≤ 2P (T n p,δ ) max a n ∈A n S W ⊗n s (a n )
for any positive ω if n is sufficiently large.
We now have
+ a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n ) − a n ∈T n p,δ p n (a n )S W ⊗n s (a n ) ≤ 2ω .
for any positive ω if n is sufficiently large. Thus when J n · L n < 2 mins nχ(p;Bs)−µ holds we also have J n · L n < 2 mins nχ(p ;Bs)−µ .
if n is sufficiently large.
By (41) we can apply (39) to X j,l . We have: If n is sufficiently large the event
has a positive probability with respect to p . This means that for any > 0 if n is sufficiently large we can find a realization x j,l of X j,l with a positive probability such that for all s ∈ θ, t n ∈ θ n , π ∈ Π n , and j ∈ {1, . . . , J n }, we have
and
We define for π ∈ Π n its permutation matrix on H ⊗n by P π . We have V t n (π(x n )) = P π V π −1 (t n ) (x n )P † π . For π ∈ Π n , we define Θ t n ,π := x n ∈T p,δ p (x n )Q t n (π(x n )). We have Θ t n ,π = P π x n ∈T p,δ p (x n )Q π −1 (t n ) (x n ) P † π = P π Θ π(t n ) P † π . We choose suitable positive α. For any given j ∈ {1, . . . , J n } we have
where the first inequality is an application of the triangle inequality, the second is again the triangle inequality combined with (14) . The following equality follows because U · A · U † 1 = A 1 for all A ∈ B(H ⊗n ) and unitary matrices U ∈ B(H ⊗n ). At last, we use (43).
By (44) we have
By Lemma 3.5 and the inequality (44), for a uniformly distributed random variable R uni with values in {1, . . . , J n } and all π ∈ Π n and t n ∈ θ n we have
By (45), for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, we have
For an arbitrary positive δ let Jn j=1 a n ∈A n E n (a n |j)tr W ⊗n s (a n )D j ≥ 1 − , max t n ∈θ n max π∈Πn χ (R uni ; Z t n ,π ) ≤ .
We obtain
The achievability of lim n→∞ 1 n min s∈θ χ(p U ; B ⊗n s ) − max t n ∈θ n χ(p U ; Z t n ) is then shown via standard arguments (cf. [25] ). Now we are going to prove the converse.
: j}) be a sequence of (n, J n ) code such that max s∈θ P e (C n , s, n) ≤ λ n ,
where lim n→∞ λ n = 0 and lim n→∞ n = 0. where R uni is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · J n }.
It is known (cf. ( [39] )) that the capacity of a classical-quantum channel W cannot exceed I(R uni ; B). Since the capacity of a compound classical-quantum channel (W s ) s∈θ cannot exceed the worst channel in {W s : s ∈ θ}, its capacity is bounded by 1 n (min s∈θ χ(p U ; B s ). The enhanced achievable secrecy rate for the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel can not exceed the capacity without wiretapper, thus for any ξ > 0 choose n = 1 2 ξ, if n is sufficiently large, the secrecy rate of (C n ) can not be greater than
the third equality holds because R uni → A → {B ⊗n s , Z t n : s, t n } is always a Markov chain.
This and (47) proof Theorem 3.1. 
It is known [35] that this norm is multiplicative, i.e. W ⊗ W ♦ = W ♦ · W ♦ .
A τ -net in the space of the completely positive trace-preserving maps S(H ) → S(H ) is a finite set W (k) K k=1 of completely positive trace-preserving maps S(H ) → S(H ) with the property that for each completely positive tracepreserving map W : We now consider a θ such that |θ| is not finite. We assume there is a series of positive constants {τ n : n ∈ N} such that ( 3 τn ) 2d 4 ≥ 2 −nβ/2 and lim n→∞ nτ n = 0. By Lemma 3.7 there exists a finite set θ τn with |θ τn | ≤ ( 3 τn ) 2d 4 and τ n -nets W s s ∈θτ n , (V s ) s ∈θτ n such that for every t ∈ θ we can find a s ∈ θ τn with
We assume that the sender's encoding is restricted to transmitting an indexed finite set of quantum states {ρ x : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(H ⊗n ). By Theorem 3.1 the legal transmitters build now a code C 2 = {E, {D j : j}}. such that for all s ∈ θ τn , t ∈ θ, and π ∈ Π n it holds
Let |ψ x n ψ x n | ∈ S(H ⊗n ⊗ H ⊗n ) be an arbitrary purification of the quantum state ρ x n , then tr W ⊗n
= tr
The second equality follows from the definition of trace. The second inequality follows by the definition of · ♦ . The third inequality follows from the facts
It follows that
By (52) we have
The achievability of lim n→∞ 1 n min s∈θ χ(p U ; B s ) − max t n ∈θ n χ(p U ; Z t n ) is then shown via standard arguments.
The proof of the converse is similar to those given in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Proof. The corollary follows immediately from the fact that the enhanced secrecy capacity of a compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel is less or equal to its secrecy capacity.
Secrecy Capacity of Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Wiretap Channel
In this section we use the results of Section 3 to proof our main result: the formula for the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Theorem 4.1. Let θ := {1, · · · , T } be a finite index set. Let (W t , V t ) t∈θ be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. We have
Here Conv((B t ) t∈θ ) is the convex hull of {B t : t ∈ θ}.
Proof. i) Achievement
Our idea is similar to the results for classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel in [37] : Applying Ahlswede's robustification technique (cf. [12] ), we use the results of Section 3 to show the exist of a common randomness assisted quantum code. Additionally, we have to consider the security.
We denote the set of distribution function on θ by P(θ). For every q ∈ P(θ) we define a classical-quantum channel W q := s∈θ q(s)W s . We now define a compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel by
We fix a probability distribution p ∈ A. We choose arbitrarily > 0, δ > 0, and ζ > 0. Let J n = 2 n inf Bq ∈Conv((Bs) s∈θ ) χ(p;Bq)−max t n ∈θ n χ(p;Z t n )−nδ .
By Corollary 3.6 if n is sufficiently large there exists an (n, J n ) code C = E n , {D n j : j = 1, · · · J n } such that
Similar to the proofs in [12] we apply now Ahlswede's robustification technique.
Lemma 4.2 (cf. [3] , [4] , and [5] ). Let S be a finite set and n ∈ N. If a function f : S n → [0, 1] satisfies s n ∈S n f (s n )q(s 1 )q(s 2 ) · · · q(s n ) ≥ 1 − , for all q ∈ P(θ) and a positive ∈ [0, 1], then
We define a function f : θ n → [0, 1] by
tr(W t n (E n ( |j))D n j ) .
For every q ∈ P(θ) we have
Applying Lemma 4.2 we have
Jn j=1 a n ∈A n E n (a n |j)tr(W π(t n ) (a n )D n j )
Jn j=1 a n ∈A n E n (a n |j)tr(W t n (π −1 (a n ))P † π D n j P π ) ,
where for π ∈ Π n , P π is its permutation matrix on H ⊗n . We define now our common randomness assisted quantum code by π • E n , {P π D n j P † π , j ∈ {1, · · · , J n }} : π ∈ Π n . P π D n j P † π is Hermitian. and positive semi-definite. Furthermore it holds Jn j=1 P π D n j P † π = Jn j=1 P π id H ⊗n P † π = id H ⊗n . By (56) and by the fact that
for any positive ε when n is sufficiently large it holds:
The achievability of lim n→∞ 1 n min Bq∈Conv((Bs) s∈θ ) χ(p U ; B ⊗n q ) − max t n ∈θ n χ(p U ; Z t n ) is then shown via standard arguments (cf. [25] ).
ii) Converse
Now we are going to prove the converse. Similar to the results for classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel in [37] we limit the amount of common randomness.
Let ({C γ n : γ ∈ Γ}) be a sequence of (n, J n ) common randomness assisted codes such that
where lim n→∞ λ n = 0 and lim n→∞ n = 0.
We consider when a |Γ|-long sequence of outputs (1, · · · , |Γ|) has been given by the common randomness and a n |Γ|-long block has been sent. The legal receiver obtain the quantum states {B γ q : γ ∈ Γ} By (58) he is able to decode 2 n|Γ| log Jn messages. By [12] , for every B q ∈ Conv((B s ) s∈θ ) we have
and by (59) for and every t n ∈ θ n we have if q, q ∈ P(θ) satisfy q − q 1 ≤ δ, for some f (δ) which tends to 0 as δ tends to 0. We write µ(I q,s n ) := γ∈Γ µ(γ)I q,s n (γ), where µ(γ) is the probability of γ. Then for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are L = n 2 realizations γ 1 , · · · , γ L such that
for every q ∈ P(θ) and s n ∈ θ n .
Proof. Let 0 < δ < 1 2 and K be a positive integer. We denote the set of possible types of sequences of length K by P K 0 (θ). As in the approximation argument in [16] , one can show that every q ∈ P(θ) is at most a distance δ away from some
. This approximating set is used to handle the infinite set P(θ). Now let G 1 , · · · , G L be i.i.d. random variables with values in Γ and distributed according to µ. Set µ * := min q∈P(θ) min s n ∈θ n µ(I q,s n ). Using the union bound and the Chernov bound (cf. [26] ), we obtain
This probability is smaller than 1 if L tends to infinity faster than n, e.g. if L = n 2 . Thus we have proved the existence of γ 1 , · · · , γ L which satisfy
for every q ∈ P K 0 (θ) and s n ∈ θ n . Now let q ∈ P(θ) be arbitrary and let
Choosing δ sufficiently small proves the claim of the lemma.
For q ∈ Conv({s : s ∈ θ}) we define
In [22] the continuity of q → 1 n χ(R uni ; B γ⊗n q ) has been shown, thus
where B γ q and Z γ t n are the quantum states at the output of legal receiver channel and the wiretapper's channel, respectively, when the output of the common randomness is γ . Thus
To prove the converse we now consider
Let G uni be the uniformly distributed random variable with value in Γ . We have 
Let φ j,γ t n be the quantum state at the output of wiretapper's channel when the channel state is t n , the output of the common randomness is γ, and j has been sent.
We have
Let H G be a |Γ | dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal basis {|i : i = 1, · · · , |Γ |}. Let H J be a J n dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal basis {|j : j = 1, · · · , J n }. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [20] we define
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy it holds S(ϕ JH n ) + S(ϕ GH n ) ≥ S(ϕ H n ) + S(ϕ JGH n ), therefore
By (61) and (63) we have
Thus for every B q ∈ Conv((B s ) s∈θ ) and every t n ∈ θ n we have
. The converse has been shown. (57) and (64) prove Theorem 4.1.
Similar to the proof of of Theorem 3.1.1 in [20] for any positive ϑ if {W t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable n is sufficiently large there is a code
: i ∈ {1, · · · , n 3 }} with deterministic encoder of length µ(n), where 2 µ(n) = o(n) for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
We now can construct a code C det = E µ(n)+n , D µ(n)+n j
where for a µ(n)+n = (a µ(n) , a n ) ∈ A µ(n)+n
Similar to the proof of of Theorem 3.1.1 in [20] for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large we have max t µ(n)+n ∈θ µ(n)+n P e (C det , t µ(n)+n ) < λ , max t µ(n)+n ∈θ µ(n)+n χ R uni , Z C det ,t µ(n)+n < λ . : i ∈ {1, · · · , n 3 }} is a code for the chan-
Since it may happen that {W t • T U : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable although {W t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable (cf. [33] for an example in classical case).
Investigation of Secrecy Capacity's Continuity
In this section we show that the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel under common randomness assisted quantum coding is continuous in the following sense: 
Proof. By Corollary 4.4 the secrecy capacity of
where B t is the resulting quantum state at the output of W t and Z t is the resulting quantum state at the output of V t .
To analyze |χ(p; Z t n ) − χ(p; Z t n )| we use the technique introduced in [31] and apply the following lemma given in [9] Lemma 5.2 (Alicki-Fannes Inequality). Supposed we have a composite system PQ with components P and Q. Let G P and G Q be Hilbert space of P and Q, respectively. Suppose we have two bipartite quantum states φ PQ and σ PQ in S(G PQ ) such that φ PQ − σ PQ 1 = < 1, it holds
where d is the dimension of G P and h( ) is defined as in Lemma 3.5.
The different to [9] is we consider here classical-quantum channels instead of quantum-quantum channels.
We fix an n ∈ N and a t n = (t 1 , · · · t n ) ∈ θ n . For any a n ∈ A n we have |S (V t n (a n )) − S (V t n (a n ))| = n k=1 S V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k ,···tn) (a n ) − S V (t1,···t k ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) (a n ) ≤ n k=1 S V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k ,···tn) (a n ) − S V (t1,···t k ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) (a n ) .
For a k ∈ {1, · · · , n} and a n = (a 1 , · · · a n ) ∈ A n by Lemma 5.2 we have S V (t1,···t k+1 ) ⊗ V (t k ,···tn) (a n ) − S V (t1,···t k+1 ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) (a n ) = S V (t1,···t k ) ⊗ V (t k ,···tn) (a n ) − S V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) ((a 1 , · · · a k−1 , a k+1 , · · · a n )) − S V (t1,···t k ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) (a n ) + S V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) ((a 1 , · · · a k−1 , a k+1 , · · · a n )) = S V t k (a k ) | V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) ((a 1 , · · · a k−1 , a k+1 , · · · a n )) − S V t k (a k ) | V (t1,···t k−1 ) ⊗ V (t k+1 ,···tn) ((a 1 , · · · a k−1 , a k+1 , · · · a n ))
where d E is the dimension of H E .
Thus |S (V t n (a n )) − S (V t n (a n ))| ≤ 4nδ log(d E − 1) − 2n · h(δ) .
For any probability distribution p ∈ P(A), n ∈ N, and t n ∈ θ n we have 
We fix a probability distribution q on θ, a probability distribution p ∈ P(A), and an n ∈ N. By Lemma 3. 
where d B is the dimension of H B .
Thus for any probability distribution q on θ, n ∈ N, p ∈ P(A), t n ∈ θ n we have for all {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} ∈ C δ (χ(p; B q ) − 1 n χ(p; Z t n )) − (χ(p; B q ) − 1 n χ(p; Z t n )) ≤ 8δ log(d B − 1) + 8δ log(d E − 1) − 8 · h(δ) .
For any positive we can find a positive δ such that 8δ log(d B − 1) + 8δ log(d E − 1) − 8 · h(δ) ≤ .
Thus for all n ∈ N and any positive we can find a positive δ such that for all {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} ∈ C δ For r ∈ [0, 1] let P r be the probability distribution on A such that P r (0) = r and P r (1) = 1 − r. We define a channel W In other world:
Let H E = C 5 . Let {|0 E , |1 E , |2 E , |3 E , |4 E be a set of orthonormal vectors on H E . We define a channel V λ 1 : P(A) → S(H E ) by
and a channel V λ 2 : P(A) → S(H E ) by
In other world:
For every a ∈ A and t ∈ θ we have 
Conclusion
In this paper we deliver the formula for the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. In our previous paper [20] we established the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels: Either the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero, or it equals its randomness assisted secrecy capacity, depending on the status where legal receiver's channel is symmetrizable or not. When we combine the results of these two works we can now completely characterize the secrecy capacity formulas for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels (cf. Corollary 4.4).
As an application of these results turn to general question: When secure message transmission trough arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels continuous? Our results show the discontinuity in general and demonstrate the importance of shared randomness: it stabilizes the secure message transmission trough arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
